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Abstract
 is paper presents an overview of the strategic and security issues 
surrounding the Straits of Malacca.  It begins by introducing the strategic 
nature of the Straits of Malacca and piracy threat in the busy sea lane. 
Subsequently this paper discusses the issues and interests of the emerging 
powers in the Straits of Malacca historically.  is covers the Asia’s 
emerging powers such as India, Japan and China.  en, the position of 
the three littoral states of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore towards the 
issue of piracy in the Straits of Malacca is touched upon before analyzing 
the littoral states’ position on external powers’ involvement in the Straits 
of Malacca.   is paper also briefl y discusses the individual littoral states’ 
interests in the vital sea lane.
INTRODUCTION: THE STRATEGIC NATURE OF THE 
STRAITS OF MALACCA
  e major sea lanes in Southeast Asia are comprised of a few key straits 
such as the Malacca and Singapore Straits, the Sunda Straits and the 
Lombok Straits. Of these regional chokepoints, the Straits of Malacca 
has been of profound signifi cance. Indeed, this long and shallow channel 
has acted as both gateway and bottleneck, at least since the earliest 
recorded history.  It has been the scene of almost unending struggles for 
control among competing political and commercial interests, both local 
and distant, and yet has provided a lifeline that has brought prosperity 
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and development to states and peoples dependent on imports or exports 
of goods exchanged with remotely located partners.1
At diff erent times in its history, the Straits of Malacca has been controlled 
by the Dutch, Portuguese, and British, and has been used to link Africa 
and India to China, Japan, and Southeast Asia.2  Controlling the precious 
commodities of the region which had to pass the Straits was the prize. " e 
spices of the Mollucas, the jungle products of the interior, the precious 
metals of the hinterlands were to bring explorers, traders, merchants, 
colonists and eventually, colonisation to the region.3
Today, the Straits of Malacca is the world’s second busiest commercial 
shipping lane, surpassed only by the Dover Strait which runs between 
Britain and France.4  In essence, the Straits of Malacca derive their 
enduring importance from the simple factor of strategic location. An 
appreciation of this factor can be gained from a glance at the geographic 
patterns portrayed in Appendix 1, showing the arrangement of continental, 
peninsular and archipelagic land masses and the straits and seas around 
them.5  Unquestionably, the Straits of Malacca remains a key point on 
the shortest sea route from the ports of India and the Persian Gulf and 
from the entrepots of Europe via the Suez Canal-Red Sea route to port 
of mainland East Asia.6
For centuries, the Straits of Malacca, a narrow waterway has been a 
major conduit for long distance trade between Asia and the West.  " e 
Straits is 520 miles long, and provide the main corridor between the 
1 D.B. Freeman, " e Straits of Malacca: gateway or gauntlet?, McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, Montreal, 2003, p. 5. 
2 D. Phaovisaid, Where there’s sugar, the ants come: piracy in the Straits of Malacca, 
International Aff airs Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2005, p. 2. 
3 M. Cleary, K.C. Goh & G.K. Chuan, Environment and development in the Straits of 
Malacca, Routledge, London, p. 1.
4 D. Phaovisaid, Where there’s sugar, the ants come: piracy in the Straits of Malacca, p. 
2.  
5 D.B. Freeman, " e Straits of Malacca: gateway or gauntlet?, p. 3.
6 Ibid., p. 6.
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Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.  Because the Straits is relatively 
shallow, being only 21.8 metres deep at some points, the maximum 
draught recommended by the IMO for passing ships is 19.8 metres. 
! e navigable channel at its narrowest point is only 1.5 miles wide.7 ! is 
creates a natural bottleneck, with the potential for a collision, grounding 
or oil spill. ! e disruption of shipping or any threat to close or restrict 
access through the Straits of Malacca would have a signifi cant impact on 
world oil prices.  If necessary, shippers could avoid the Straits but only 
at some additional cost, time and disruption.8 In terms of total volume, 
in 2007 for instance, at least 70,718 ships passed through the Straits of 
Malacca, ranging from Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) to fi shing 
vessels.9 Moreover in terms of value, the total tonnages carried by ships 
through the Straits of Malacca every year amount to 525 million metric 
tonnes worth a total of US$390 billion.10   ! e traffi  c volume makes the 
Straits of Malacca one of the busiest Straits in the world currently and it 
is likely to become even busier in the future as a result of increasing trade 
fl ows and energy demands in Asia.
Given the statistics, the waterway is extremely important to the 
international users as well as to the littoral states. ! e Straits of Malacca 
is the most used and the most well known of the Southeast Asian waters. 
Huge tonnages of ships continue to pass through the Straits, drawing 
on both international markets and on local and regional feeder ports.11 
In terms both of number of vessels traversing it daily, annual tonnages, 
and the value of cargo moving through it and in terms of considerable 
diffi  culty and cost of avoiding or skirting around this bottleneck the 
7 J. Ho, ! e security of regional sea lanes, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 
Singapore, 2005, p. 2.
8 C.W. Pumphrey (ed.), ! e rise of China in Asia: security implications, Diane Publishing, 
2002, p. 246.
9 Type and total of vessel report to Klang vts from January 1999 to December 2007, 
http://www.marine.gov.my/service/statistik/BKP/total_report_07.pdf (25 March 2008)
10 S. Bateman, C.Z. Raymond & J. Ho, Safety and security in the Malacca and Singapore 
Straits: an agenda for action, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 2006, 
p. 18. 
11 M. Cleary, K.C. Goh & G.K. Chuan, Environment and development in the Straits of 
Malacca, p. 6.
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shipping channel through the Straits of Malacca ranks among the most 
important of global trade gateways.12
! e Straits of Malacca is shared between Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore and serves as a major international navigation route linking 
the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea. Merchant ships from Japan 
and other East Asian states en route to South Asia, the Middle East or 
Europe also pass through the Straits of Malacca. ! e Straits of Malacca 
is the shortest and preferred route for ships less than 250,000 tons 
dwt (dead weight tonnage) transiting the Indian Ocean and the South 
China Sea when compared to the next best alternatives, the Lombok, 
Makassar and Sunda Straits.13 On a global basis, some 72 percent of 
east-bound loaded tankers transit the Straits of Malacca. ! e availability 
of excellent bunker fuel, communication and repair facilities, particularly 
in Singapore and Malaysia makes it doubly attractive for ships to use 
the Straits of Malacca route.14 By using the Straits instead of the other 
alternative routes, super-large tankers ferrying crude oil from Middle 
East to the Far East can save up to 1,600 kilometre or roughly three days 
sailing time.15
According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
currently 11 million barrels of oil per day (b/d) passes through the Straits 
of Malacca, but this would be increased as oil consumption in developing 
Asian nations rises by an estimated average of three percent per annum 
until 2025.  China alone will account for one-third of that increase, which 
will see demand growth doubling to nearly 30 million b/d in 2025 from 
14.5 million b/d in 2000.16 Moreover, according to the EIA, much of the 
12 D.B. Freeman, ! e Straits of Malacca: gateway or gauntlet?, p. 6.
13 Y. Vertzberger, ! e Malacca/Singapore Straits, Asian Survey, Vol. 22, No. 7, 1982, p. 
610.
14 Hamzah Ahmad, ! e Straits of Malacca international cooperation in trade, funding 
and navigational safety, Pelanduk Publications, Kuala Lumpur and Institute of Maritime 
Malaysia, 1992, p.8. 
15 Researcher’s Interview with Ahmad Ghazali Abu Hassan on 19 March 2008.
16 Country analysis briefs: South China Sea, www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/schina.html. 
(10 March 2008).  
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additional supply will be imported from the Middle East and Africa and 
most of this volume would need to pass through the strategic Straits of 
Malacca.17
! e Straits of Malacca is among the most strategically important 
international waterways of the world. It is a chokepoint in naval terms, 
the control of which is desirable for strategic mobility.18 It is also a very 
congested waterway with some 200 ships plying the Straits daily. For 
every ship that passes through however, there is a risk not only of an 
accident that might include crude oil, toxic chemicals or radioactive 
substances but also of a piracy attack. ! e threat of an ecological disaster 
caused by such an attack cannot be ignored. Any disruption to traffi  c or 
any increase in dangers to the crew of ship using the Straits particularly 
due to pirate attacks may force the vessels which pass through the Straits 
to use the longer safer route. ! e fi ght against piracy is thus, part of the 
eff orts to enhance the overall safety of passage through the vital Straits.
Traffi  c in the Straits of Malacca has rapidly augmented in the last few 
years as a result of increased crude shipments to China. ! e free and 
save navigation of commercial vessels in Southeast Asia is thus, essential 
for international trade. ! e surge in piracy is one of the dark sides of 
globalisation. ! e increase in international trade over the past decade 
means more opportunities for pirates to attack merchant ships. Director 
of the Royal Malaysian Police said that “where there’s sugar, the ants 
come”.19 ! e Straits of Malacca is the world’s second busiest commercial 
shipping lane and the lifeline of the economy of many countries that 
depend on the safe and timely shipment of oil and industrial goods to 
support economic growth. However, maritime piracy continues to be a 
paramount threat in the Straits. ! erefore, the necessary eff orts must be 
undertaken to tackle the issue either among the littoral states or between 
the littoral states and the user states.
17 Ibid.
18 Hamzah Ahmad, ! e Straits of Malacca: a profi le, in, Hamzah Ahmad (ed.), ! e Straits 
of Malacca: international cooperation in trade, funding and navigational safety, p. 10.
19 D. Phaovisaid, Where there’s sugar, the ants come: piracy in the Straits of Malacca, p. 
2.
Seminar on National Resilience
88
PIRACY THREAT IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA
Piracy is a historical and cultural phenomenon that has continued in 
this modern age to aff ect maritime traffi  c in some of the world’s busiest 
shipping lanes. Many of the piracy incidents occur along the coasts of 
South Africa, Nigeria, Bangladesh, India, Ecuador, and in the Red Sea. 
According to the report by the IMB-PRC, the number of piracy attacks 
on shipping throughout the world in 2006 was 239. # is represents a 
signifi cant drop in the number of attacks from the previous year of 276. 
# e number of incidents of piracy increased in 2007 when 263 incidents 
were reported. However, based on the report, there were only seven cases 
reported to have occurred in the Straits of Malacca. According to the 
IMB-PRC, the piracy attacks are divided based on location for example 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Straits of Malacca.20 # e principle 
purpose of this is to increase awareness of the problem, impress upon the 
Governmental representatives concerned the need for action and more 
importantly, motivate political will to act at national and regional level 
for preventing and suppressing piracy.21 According to the report provided 
by IMB, the nature of the attacks indicates that the pirates boarding the 
vessels are better armed and they have shown no hesitation in assaulting 
and injuring the crew. However, the IMB does not provide the nature of 
attack by location.
Most of the concerns regarding piracy in Southeast Asia have in recent 
years focused on the southern parts of the Straits of Malacca. # ere 
appears to be two main reasons for this. First, it is clear that the Straits of 
Malacca is of major strategic importance as a bottleneck for international 
maritime trade. An attack blocking the Straits, would force vessels to take 
the detour around the west coast of Sumatra, something which would 
have large economic consequences not least for Europe, Japan and the 
20 ICC-IMB Piracy and armed robbery against ships report, annual report 1 January – 31 
December 2007, p. 12.
21 Researcher’s interview with the International Maritime Bureau’s Assistant Director, 
Noel Choong on 05 March 2008.
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US.22 Second, the threat of “petty piracy” which for the last two decade 
has been a relatively minor security concern for commercial vessels in the 
southern parts of the Straits seems to indicate a greater risk for terror 
attacks against transiting commercial vessels.23 ! e assumption seems 
to be that the pirates who frequently attack commercial vessels for the 
purpose of robbing them might get the idea of perpetrating a terrorist 
attack.
Piracy in the Straits of Malacca has already led to a high economic cost 
refl ected by the loss of merchandise and ships and the increased insurance 
premiums added to a number of cargoes that pass through the Straits. 
Moreover, an accident caused by a piracy incident or a terrorist attack 
on an oil supertanker crossing the Straits could cause an environmental 
disaster of massive proportions.24
ASIA’S EMERGING POWERS IN THE STRAITS OF 
MALACCA  
! e strategic nature of the Straits of Malacca as the main sea lane of 
communication to East Asia has led many countries wanting to control 
the Straits including the US, China, Japan and India.Furthermore, the 
major regional sea powers are competing for Asian maritime dominance. 
! e US as a global sea power, sees India and Japan as key partners in 
balancing the rise of China and it also busy fostering international 
maritime cooperation to build what two senior US Naval offi  cers have 
referred to as “! e 1000-Ship Global Maritime Network” top counter 
terrorism.25 Indeed, the pursuance of strategies to gain control has made 
the Straits of Malacca a venue of a silent struggle between rising powers. 
22 S.E. Amirell, Political piracy and maritime terrorism: a comparison between the 
Straits of Malacca and the Southern Philippines, in, G.G. Ong-Webb (ed.), Piracy 
and maritime terrorism and securing the Malacca Straits, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Singapore, 2006, p. 57.
23 Ibid., p. 57.
24 R. Emmers, Non-traditional security in the Asia Pacifi c: the dynamic of securitization, 
p. 33.  
25 ! e “1000 ship navy” global maritime partnerships, http://www.jhuapl.edu/
maritimestrategy/library/1000shipNov06.pdf (18 March 2008)
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Because the Straits of Malacca is so important to the transportation of 
oil and raw material, the free and safe navigation of commercial vessels 
in the sea lane becomes an important issue to the littoral states as well as 
the user states.
Japan
As a major user state, Japan maintained a special interest in the Straits 
of Malacca essentially for commercial reasons. Japan’s prime concern has 
been the safe and uninterrupted passage of the large number of huge oil 
tankers that carry the country’s major energy supply from the Persian 
Gulf. ! e vulnerability of that oil lifeline has been responsible not only 
for Japan’s willingness to fi nance hydrographic surveys of the Straits in 
order to improve safety of navigation but also for Tokyo’s ill-considered, 
aborted attempt during 1971, to impose an internationally controlled 
regime.26 If a potentially hostile power were to gain control of the 
maritime approaches to Southeast Asia, Japan’s economic health would 
be fundamentally threatened.  As long as the US remains the dominant 
world power, and has a strong alliance with Japan, this will not occur.27 ! e 
Japanese policy, however, has been ambivalent because it has attempted 
to divorce military from commercial considerations. ! erefore, it is 
important to take note that the two most important variables defi ning 
Japan’s future sea lane security are the continued forward presence of 
the US Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacifi c and China’s future political 
orientation and maritime strategy.28
Japan’s desire to send its military forces to assist in the security of the 
Straits of Malacca is due to its own interests. Almost 80 percent of Japan’s 
oil import trade traffi  c from the Middle East travels through the Straits 
of Malacca, giving that major global power enormous vested interest 
26 S. Bateman, Regional response to enhance maritime security in East Asia, the Korean 
Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2006, p. 30.
27 P. Dibb, Indonesia: the key to Southeast Asia’s security, International Aff airs, Vol. 77, 
No. 4, p. 833.
28 E. Graham, Japan’s sea lane security, 1940-2004: a matter of life and death?, Routledge, 
New York, 2006, p. 2.
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in a range of maritime issues in the region. Equally, as the economic 
power of Southeast Asia grows, passage through the Straits has assumed 
even greater importance. A combination of archipelagic geography, poor 
resources allocation and the large distances separating Japan from its 
primary suppliers of energy, raw materials and food has accentuated the 
importance of shipping to its security.29 Japan depends particularly on 
sea lanes connecting it with the oil terminals in the Gulf, from which 
it draws nearly all its oil, and other shipping routes connecting it with 
the mineral resources of the Indian Ocean basin, Southeast Asia and 
North America. Japan’s economy highly depends on safe passage of ships 
through the Straits of Malacca, and therefore, Japan has long cooperated 
with Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia in the area of navigation safety 
and seabed mapping through joint research, sharing of equipment and 
training.
! e Straits of Malacca is important to ship Japanese manufactured 
goods to Europe, Australia, the Middle East and Africa. It is, therefore, 
in Japan’s interests to ensure the security of the Straits of Malacca.30 In 
addition, Japan is one of the biggest supporters of both regional and 
multilateral eff orts to combat piracy. It has sponsored anti-piracy drills 
and joint exercises with littoral states, and as the US closest ally in the 
Asia Pacifi c region, Japan has cooperated with the US under the RMSI 
and PSI.31 ! e Japan-US alliance is the most signifi cant pillar of Japan’s 
security strategy ever since the end of World War II.  ! e alliance initially 
served the purpose of ensuring the security of Japan.  Both countries have 
overriding common interests stretching from economic interdependence 
29 Graham, Japan’s sea lane security, 1940-2004: a matter of life and death?, p.2.
30 ! e Ministry of Foreign Aff airs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/piracy/index.
html (02 April 2008).
31 Singapore’s cooperation with the US, Japan and Australia in the war against global 
terrorism, www.msstate.edu/chair/radvanyi/ICWAT/Tan_Andrew_Paper.pdf (02 April 
2008)
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to political coordination and strategic alignment.32 ! erefore, Japan 
supports the initiatives proposed by the US to tackle piracy threat in the 
Straits of Malacca and also in US war on terror.
! e increase in piracy incidents in the Straits since the 1997/1998 Asian 
economic crisis resulted in an increase of Japanese assistance in anti-
piracy eff orts. Japan has also aided civilian law enforcement capabilities 
of the littoral states through its Coast Guard. In addition, Japanese Coast 
Guard vessels have carried out joint exercise with civilian maritime 
counterparts in Southeast Asia. Japan’s approach emphasises the 
sovereignty of the littoral states and focuses in their cooperative capacity 
building. ! e Japan International Cooperation Agency ( JICA) funds the 
Coast Guard’s seminars to train maritime authorities in Southeast Asia, 
and Japan’s aid is critical in helping to create maritime patrol authority 
where local capacity is lacking particularly in Indonesia.33 
At the 1999 ASEAN Plus ! ree (APT) Summit, the late Japan’s 
Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi fi rst suggested the creation of a regional 
coastguard as an anti-piracy measure.34 It was proposed that these patrols 
be based on a multilateral approach and involve Japan, South Korea, 
China and the three littoral states. ! e two littoral states of Malaysia 
and Indonesia, nonetheless, strongly oppose the internationalization of 
the Straits of Malacca. ! e littoral states welcomed Japan’s help in forms 
other than military forces. Furthermore, China openly opposed Japan’s 
proposal, which was perceived in Beijing as an eff ort to reduce its rising 
maritime infl uence in Southeast Asia. For a long time, Japan has wanted 
to mobilize its forces to help in the patrols, but this has always been 
refused.
32 S.T. Hook, Comparative foreign policy adaptation strategies of the great and emerging 
powers, Pearson Education, New Jersey, 2002, p. 110.
33 Y. Sato, Southeast Asian receptiveness to Japanese maritime security cooperation, p. 5.
34 R. Emmers, Comprehensive security and resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s 
approach to terrorism and sea piracy, p. 23.
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Bilateral cooperation has also steadily advanced.  For example, in 
November 2000, a patrol vessel of the Japan Coast Guard visited India and 
Malaysia for combined exercises aimed at combating piracy.35 Meanwhile, 
it is not an easy task to develop a framework of regional eff orts, because 
the problem is directly concerned with national sovereignty. In February 
2001, Japan announced that it is considering deploying vessels to patrol 
the Straits of Malacca as an eff ort to combat piracy.36 Tokyo’s proposal 
to join forces from Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea and 
China to patrol the waterways comes during a growing debate over the 
possible revision of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution.37 " is refl ects 
a change in the Japanese thinking regarding maritime security. Tokyo 
realises that Japan is indeed a major maritime power with strategic 
interests. Moreover, Japan has come under growing pressure from the US 
to assume a greater security profi le for a more dynamic and active role in 
its national interests. Although Japan continues to propose multilateral 
joint patrols, Southeast Asian nations, particularly the littoral states 
of Malaysia and Singapore have so far not accepted the proposal. " e 
lingering memories of Japanese wartime behaviour make this proposal 
diffi  cult for Southeast Asian governments and their publics to accept. 
Moreover, Japan’s interpretation of Article 9 of its Constitution restricts 
Japanese defence to Japanese citizens or Japan fl agged vessels, and rejects 
collective self-defence, casting doubt on Japan’s ability to be of much 
direct help.38 
In November 2004, Japan led a multilateral initiative to establish an 
information-sharing centre in Singapore. " is initiative involved 16 
Asian countries in the eff ort. Furthermore, Japan has taken unilateral 
35 India challenges China in South China Sea, www.atimes.com/ind-pak/BD27Df01.
html (25 March 2008)
36 Southeast Asia’s maritime security dilemma: states or market? http://www.japanfocus.
org/products/topdf/244 (23 March 2008)
37 Forging a new Japan, http://www.atimes.com/japan-econ/BB23Dh01.html (26 March 
2008)
38 M.J. Valencia, Politics of anti-piracy and anti-terrorism responses in the Malacca 
Straits, in, G.G. Ong-Web (ed.), Piracy, maritime terrorism and securing the Malacca 
Straits, p. 96.  
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steps to devote ten naval ships to monitoring the high seas around the 
Straits of Malacca. Japan also announced its plans to present three new, 
high speed patrol boats worth US$10.5 million each to the Indonesian 
government as part of Japan’s overseas development assistance in 2005.39 
Japan’s anti-piracy eff orts have also promoted multilateral institution 
building in the region. Japan for instance has fi nanced eff orts of the 
IMO to track and study piracy incidents. Japan’s Ship and Ocean 
Foundation has also provided seed money for the IMO sanctioned Anti-
Piracy Centre in Kuala Lumpur. In March 2005, Japan held the second 
“ASEAN-Japan Seminar on Maritime Security and Combating Piracy” 
in Tokyo to review progress of the ASEAN countries on implementation 
of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.40
Indeed, following the abduction of Japanese crew of tugboat in the 
Straits of Malacca in March 2005, Japan off ered to provide Indonesia 
with high speed patrol boats for anti-piracy missions in the vital sea lane. 
Japan also proposed in 2005, multinational patrols in both territorial 
and international waters as a counter piracy measure. " is was received 
with scepticism by the littoral states particularly Indonesia and Malaysia, 
concerned over the violation of their sovereignty and limitations on 
controlling their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), the littoral states 
were unwilling to allow Japanese forces to patrol their waters. 
Japan proposed the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating 
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) in 2004, 
which emphasised sharing information about ships, victimised by and 
suspected of committing piracy and armed robbery.41 ReCAAP is an 
initiative for anti-piracy cooperation amongst the ASEAN countries, 
China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. A 
key pillar of the ReCAAP Agreement is the Information Sharing Centre 
39 " e Ministry of Foreign Aff airs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/piracy/index.html (02 
April 2008).
40 " e Ministry of Foreign Aff airs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/piracy/index.
html (02 April 2008).
41 Ibid.
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(ISC), which will be an international organisation located in Singapore.42 
! e ISC will facilitate communication and information exchanges 
between the member countries, as well as improve the quality of statistics 
and reports on piracy and armed robbery against ships in the region.
Furthermore, at a meeting of the IMO in Kuala Lumpur in September 
2006, Japan proposed voluntary cost sharing for security and 
environmental protection of the Straits of Malacca among the three 
littoral states, user states, the shipping industry and other stakeholders. 
Despite the strategic signifi cance of the Straits of Malacca, Japan has so 
far focused on civilian cooperation and refrained from directly utilizing 
its maritime self-defence forces for specifi c tasks in the region other than 
disaster relief. Given that Japan occupied this region during World War 
II, activityes by Japanese military forces in this area is a sensitive issue. 
However, Japan has a huge stake in the security of the Straits of Malacca, 
given that it is its oil and economic lifeline. ! erefore, any prolonged 
disruption or instability would imperil Japanese economic interests. 
Strategically and economically, instability as a result of increased radical 
challenges to the governments of the region would also be inimical to 
Japan interests. Notoriously, Japan lacks its own sources of raw materials, 
oil most conspicuously, which need to be shipped through the vital 
chokepoint.
India
Another major power that has strong strategic interests in the Straits 
of Malacca is India. Over 50 percent of India’s trade passes through the 
Malacca Strait, making security of this waterway, particularly in the 
context of piracy there and the lurking threat of maritime terrorism, 
a crucial security concern for India.43 Inclusion in its security would 
therefore be in India’s national interest. ! e mercantile traffi  c transiting 
the Straits of Malacca passes close to the Indian area of maritime interest 
42 Ministry of Foreign Aff airs press statement; regional cooperation agreement on 
combating piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia, http://app.mfa.gov.sg/
internet/press/view_press_print.asp?post_id=1309 (29 March 2004)
43 India Navy drops another anchor, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/
HJ17Df02.html (16 April 2008).
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and therefore, any unforeseen contingency or development in the Straits 
of Malacca has security implications for India.44
India argues that it has a stake in maintaining the safety and security 
of the Straits of Malacca and that the government should pursue an 
aggressive strategy of contributing to the region’s eff orts to keep the 
Straits of Malacca safe and free from threat.45 While the littoral states are 
continuing their own initiatives to take care of this strategic waterway, 
India, which has a stake in the Straits, believes that it has a role to 
play in the Straits’ security system. And for India, the joint patrolling 
of the Straits of Malacca is evidence and endorsement of its claim that 
its security interests stretch up to and include the Straits.46 India has 
developed capabilities in various aspects of maritime security and would 
be most willing to share its expertise with the countries of the region.
India also has become increasingly involved in Southeast Asian maritime 
security, as part of its reinvigorated activism in the wider Asia Pacifi c 
region and its “Look East” policy, aimed at strengthening its infl uence 
in Southeast Asia specifi cally.47 Indian naval strategy in the new century 
demands more submarines, a strong mine clearing capability and naval air 
reconnaissance capabilities to the Straits of Malacca. India is following an 
important strategic maritime goal in a period of interdependence between 
world’s geo-economic regions and establishing an overall maritime 
presence in its sea area of strategic interest. " is strategic includes India’s 
desire to project their prowess beyond their interest.48 " erefore, India is 
working towards building a navy that can take multiple sea challenges to 
the mainland. India also underlines its claim as a leading maritime power 
through strong forward presence in each of its major island territories.
44 Sumathy Permal, India’s and China’s strategic in the Straits of Malacca, http://www.
mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/papers/pdf/sumathy/ (13 March 2008)
45 Ibid.
46 M.J. Valencia, " e Politics of anti-piracy and anti-terrorism, in, G.G. Ong-Web (ed.), 
Piracy, maritime terrorism and securing the Malacca Straits, p. 91.
47 J.F. Bradford, " e growing prospects for maritime security cooperation in Southeast 
Asia, Naval War College Review, Vol. 58, No. 3, 2005, p. 15.
48 Sumathy Permal, India’s and China’s strategic in the Straits of Malacca, http://www.
mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/papers/pdf/sumathy/ (13 March 2008)
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  e new Indian maritime doctrine also lays down multilateral naval 
cooperation as one of the guiding principles for naval forces to address 
common security concerns like protection of sea lanes, terrorism, piracy, 
drug traffi  cking and transportation of  WMD by sea.49 Besides being an 
endeavour to build bridges of friendship, providing security to the Straits 
of Malacca is also vital for India due to the economic importance of 
energy and trade fl ow. It has expanding vital trading interests in the east 
with ASEAN and East Asia. India describes the waters extending from 
the Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca, from Africa’s east coast 
to the western shores of Australia as part of its “rightful domain”.50 An 
overwhelming proportion of India’s imports, especially its oil imports, 
come by sea. Control over Sea Lane of Communications (SLOCs) is 
therefore, vital for realisation of its dreams of becoming a global economic 
powerhouse. All this requires a naval and maritime fl eet that can protect 
the SLOCs.
It is India’s national interest to ensure that the Straits of Malacca remains 
a crime free sea lane. Its closure could generate a massive increase in 
freight rates worldwide and hit bulk shipments hardest. Ensuring that 
the Straits of Malacca do not fall into hostile hands that might choke 
the free fl ow of maritime vessels is a nightmare that many countries are 
anxious to prevent from being turned into reality.51  e proposed India-
US joint patrolling of the sea lanes along the Straits of Malacca represents 
not only a new high in cooperation between the two countries, but also 
signals India’s emergence as a key player in the region.52 Moreover, there 
has been a remarkable change in India-US relations in recent years.  For 
example, in 2002 the Indian and US navies worked together to ensure 
the safe transit of high-value units through the Straits of Malacca.53
49 Safeguarding the Malacca Straits, www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/gurpreetkhurana50105.
htm (10 March 2008)
50 India navy drops another anchor, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/
HJ17Df02.html (16 April 2008)
51 India signs on as Southeast Asia watchdog, http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DD05Df01.html 
(28 March 2008)
52 Ibid.
53 J.F. Bradford,  e growing prospects for maritime security cooperation in Southeast 
Asia, p. 15.
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India has a vital interest in seeing the Straits of Malacca remain in friendly 
hands. Its policy has led to an increasing engagement with Southeast Asia 
and the sea lanes to India’s east are growing in signifi cance for its energy 
security as New Delhi is looking for oil and gas supplies from Myanmar, 
Vietnam and Indonesia. ! us, in 1999 India announced that its strategic 
interests are extended all the way from the Persian Gulf to the Straits 
of Malacca. More importantly India has a critical interest in seeing the 
Straits of Malacca as one of the world’s critical maritime superhighways 
not controlled by countries that are hostile to it. India’s seriousness in 
securing its strategic sea lane is evidenced in 2001 when India deployed 
its navy to East Asia, from Singapore to Japan.
China
China, a rising great power in the East Asian region, is also heavily 
dependant on the Straits of Malacca for trade and energy transportation. 
China’s strategic signifi cance of this Straits increases every year. At 
present, approximately 60 percent of China’s crude oil imports originate 
in the Middle East, and this fi gure is expected to rise to 75 percent by 
2015.54 Oil from the Persian Gulf and Africa is shipped to China via 
the Straits of Malacca, Lombok or Makassar Straits. Over the past 
few years Chinese leaders have come to view the straits, especially the 
Straits of Malacca, as a strategic vulnerability. In November 2003, China 
declared that certain major powers were bent on controlling the Straits, 
and called for the adoption of new strategies to mitigate the perceived 
vulnerability.55
China Youth Daily, one Chinese leading newspaper quoted saying 
that “…it is no exaggeration to say that whoever controls the Straits of 
Malacca will also have a stranglehold on the energy route of China”.56 
54 I. Storey, China’s Malacca dilemma, http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2873.html 
(20 March 2008)
55 Sumathy Permal, India’s and China’s strategic in the Straits of Malacca, http://www.
mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/papers/pdf/sumathy/ ( 13 March 2008)
56 I. Storey, China’s Malacca dilemma, http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2873.html 
(20 March 2008)
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China’s overwhelming reliance on the Straits of Malacca for energy 
transportation has made the Straits one of China’s critical SLOCs that it 
must secure, especially from hostile foreign naval forces. One of the ways 
China tries to seek SLOC security in the Straits of Malacca is through 
diplomacy. Beijing is active in fostering relationships with the littoral 
states of the Straits of Malacca, especially Malaysia. As President Hu 
Jintao of China highlighted, the Straits of Malacca dilemma is the key to 
China’s energy security and any vulnerability will be a threat to China.57 
Moreover, Zhao Nianyu of the Shanghai Institute of International 
Studies points out that the US could blockade the Straits of Malacca as 
of the three major challenges to China’s Energy Strategy.58 He further 
points to the RMSI as a fi rst step by the US military to garrison the 
Straits under the guise of counter-terrorist measures.
! e Straits of Malacca dominates more than the commercial and economic 
life lines into and out of the rapidly expanding economies of East Asia, 
particularly China. ! e global strategic growth and expansion of aspiring 
powers can be contained and regulated through the mere control over 
the movement of their naval forces through the Straits of Malacca. For 
Beijing, this reality is increasingly a vital interest. Any Chinese naval and 
military surge into the Indian Ocean must pass through the Straits of 
Malacca.59 If China is able to control the Straits of Malacca, it would 
reduce the possibility of the US hegemony in the region since the Straits 
has become a vital international waterway for both commercial and 
strategic mobility.
! e emergence of China as major global player will not only transform 
the regional geopolitical landscape but will also mean an increased 
dependence on the sea as an avenue for trade and transportation of energy 
and raw materials. Within the region, the Straits of Malacca is one of the 
57 B. ! omas, Scaling rising tides: a three-pronged approach to safeguard Malacca Straits, 
Institutes of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 2005, p. 1.
58 Ibid., p.1.
59 Mokhzani Zubir, ! e strategic values of the Straits of Malacca, http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/
htmls/papers/pdf/mokhzani/strategic-value.pdf (20 January 2008)
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main sea lanes through which trade, energy, and raw material resources 
fl ow. ! e rise of the regional power will increase the dependence on the 
regional sea lanes. ! is is because countries in the region depend on the 
sea as an avenue for trade and transportation of energy and raw materials. 
In particular, the sea lane is vital to the transportation of goods, energy 
and raw materials to the dynamic economies of Northeast Asia includes 
China which is evidenced by the volume and value of resources trade 
that fl ows through the sea lanes. China depends on the Straits to carry 
90 percent of its trade through the waterways, and more than 80 percent 
of its energy imports.60 ! erefore, the country has a vital stake in keeping 
the Straits secure and safe.
For China, its concern on the security of oil supply prompts their defence 
apparatus to project their naval power in the Straits of Malacca and further 
to the Persian Gulf.61 In addition, China has no strategic oil reserve. It 
therefore realises that without the reserve, the country’s economy is 
vulnerable. As such, China is serious in keeping the vital Straits open 
and securing the ships that are navigating through the chokepoints 
carrying crude oil from the Middle East. It is vital for China to hold 
a strong position in the Straits of Malacca. As the Straits of Malacca is 
the main entrance to East Asia from the West, China could protect its 
seaborne trade and oil supply within Southeast Asian countries. Off ensive 
military option is to deploy rapid reaction forces when a crisis occurs 
while defensive posture is by creating credible deterrence capability.62 ! e 
strategy will show China’s determination and strength to safeguard the 
country’s interests. Hence, the security of the transport corridors is a big 
concern to China particularly in the Straits of Malacca.
60 Security in the Straits of Malacca, http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2042 (27 
March 2008)
61 Mokhzani Zubir, ! e strategic values of the Straits of Malacca, http://www.mima.gov.
my/mima/htmls/papers/pdf/mokhzani/strategic-value.pdf (20 January 2008)
62 Mokhzani Zubir, ! e strategic values of the Straits of Malacca, http://www.mima.gov.
my/mima/htmls/papers/pdf/mokhzani/strategic-value.pdf (20 January 2008)  
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THE LITTORAL STATES OF THE STRAITS OF MALACCA 
Southeast Asia has several SLOCs including the Straits of Malacca, 
the Singapore Straits and Sunda Straits. ! e Straits of Malacca is of 
particular importance. It is viewed by many countries as a key feature in 
the development of commerce and security in the East-West linkage.63 
! erefore, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the security of the 
Straits of Malacca is almost indispensable for the growth of the Asian 
economies.  Due to the strategic environment in the Straits of Malacca, 
the stakes are particularly high for two groups of states. Firstly, the three 
littoral states of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore and secondly, the user 
states, especially Japan, China and South Korea, which are dependent 
on the Straits of Malacca for the uninterrupted and effi  cient transit of 
cargo, especially energy supplies. Of course the US as the most powerful 
maritime power in the world is included in the list because it is a global 
power.  ! e US has also been indicated that it would remain the largest 
economy in the world.
 e Littoral State of Malaysia
! e Straits of Malacca is seen as a critical economic artery by Malaysia. 
Malaysia depends on the Straits for resources, defence, shipping services, 
ports, tourism, and for facilitating external trade.64 ! e Straits run parallel 
to the industrial heartland of Malaysia serving the so called Western 
Corridor of Malaysia. Every major Malaysian port is located along the 
Straits of Malacca, and this is refl ected in the Malaysian eff ort to promote 
two straits ports namely Port Klang and the port of Tanjung Pelepas as 
international trans-shipment hubs for container traffi  c. Obviously the 
Straits of Malacca is strategically important to Malaysia.
! e primary aim of Malaysia is to ensure that it has complete control over 
the Straits of Malacca. Malaysia feels there is no need for the presence 
of an extra regional force for the purpose of securing the Straits and that 
63 Hamzah Ahmad, ! e Straits of Malacca: a profi le, in, Hamzah Ahmad (ed.), ! e Straits 
of Malacca: international cooperation in trade, funding and navigational safety, p. 8.
64 Hamzah Ahmad, ! e Straits of Malacca: a profi le, in, Hamzah Ahmad (ed.), ! e Straits 
of Malacca: international cooperation in trade, funding and navigational safety, p. 12.
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such presence would impinge on the sovereignty of the country. Malaysia 
disagrees with the suggestions that the US might station special forces 
in the vicinity of the Straits of Malacca to carry out counter-terrorism 
operations and piracy due to sovereignty issues as well as domestic 
political sensitivities. But this prospect resulted that the littoral states 
would cooperate more closely in carrying out coordinated year round 
patrols to ensure the security of the sea lane. At the opening ceremony 
of the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition 
(LIMA) 2007, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Datuk Seri Abdullah 
Ahmad Badawi is noted that Malaysia was against foreign military 
forces patrolling the Straits of Malacca. However, he said that Malaysia 
welcomes foreign monetary and technical aid to tighten the security in 
the vital Straits.65 Despite lingering mutual suspicions, Malaysia with 
other littoral states has in eff ect been forced to cooperate closely due to 
the US intention to establish its naval presence in the vital Straits.
Regarding the piracy threat in the Straits of Malacca, Malaysia has 
tackled the issue more aggressively. It has developed its naval capacity to 
ensure maritime security in its territorial water.For instance, Malaysia has 
its own version of the US Coast Guard to patrol and safeguard security 
along the Straits of Malacca.66 " e Malaysian Maritime Enforcement 
Agency (MMEA) as one of the important Malaysian agencies in fi ghting 
piracy has increased its patrol against piracy and the risk of maritime 
terrorism in the Straits of Malacca. It equips with vessels and aircraft 
capable of operation around the clock.  Moreover, the “Eyes in the Sky” 
(EiS) which was proposed by Malaysia is one of the signifi cant steps to 
enhance cooperation in the Straits of Malacca among the littoral states.67 
" e initiative focuses on the conducting of maritime air patrols in the 
Straits of Malacca by the three littoral states. It also allows the littoral 
states to contribute their capabilities to the security in the Straits. " e 
65 M. Lourdes, Safer through the Straits, News Straits Times, 14 December 2007.
66 Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, http://www.mmea.gov.my/mmeaBI/page.
php?pageid=35&panelmenu=2 (18 April 2008).
67 J.H. Ho, " e security of sea lanes in Southeast Asia, Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 4, 2006, 
p. 572.
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littoral states, however, recognise that they do not have adequate assets 
to implement these initiatives, thus, the involvement of user states in 
providing assets that can only be manned by personnel from the littorals, 
was adopted.
 e Littoral State of Indonesia
Meanwhile, Indonesia is another littoral state that is concerns over the 
security of the Straits of Malacca. On the Indonesian side, the Straits 
of Malacca is of great importance for similar socio-economic reasons 
like Malaysia. As an archipelagic country made up over 13,000 islands 
scattered across a range of over 5,000 kilometres from east to west, 
Indonesia’s maritime security concerns are far broader than piracy in 
the Straits of Malacca.68 Combined with the fact that major victims of 
piracy in the Straits of Malacca are merely passing through the Straits 
with little economic benefi ts to Indonesia, the country’s interest in anti-
piracy eff orts in the Straits of Malacca is limited. Among the littoral 
states, Indonesia has the longest coastline along the Malacca Straits, and 
most pirates are believed to come from that country due to its political 
instability and poor economic performance. Furthermore, Indonesia also 
has limited capability particularly in providing equipments to fi ght the 
piracy threat.
However, Indonesia has been, in recent years cracking down on piracy 
along its coasts. In particular, it has extended it police operations on 
land to deter and arrest pirates. Some signifi cant constraints remain. " e 
Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) is poorly equipped to address piracy.69 " e 
Indonesian air force also suff ers from a lack of funding, which further 
undermines Indonesia’s capability to ensure its maritime security. " e 
navy and the police in general need more manpower, funds, sophisticated 
68 Y. Sato, Southeast Asian receptiveness to Japanese maritime security cooperation, Asia 
Pacifi c Centre for Security Studies, Honolulu, 2007, p. 5.
69 US trade with Singapore, 2007, http://singapore.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/ (29 
February 2008)
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technology and weaponry to fi ght piracy eff ectively. Indonesia is keen 
to receive external assistance in the form of equipment and training, but 
wants this assistance for its own priorities.
 e Littoral State of Singapore
Singapore’s location in the heart of the Straits of Malacca and its 
economy’s critical dependence on trade, demand its attention on piracy 
in the Straits of Malacca. Combined with long-standing mistrust of 
predominantly Muslim Malaysia and Indonesia, Singapore’s high priority 
on the Straits security has led it to seek closer cooperation with external 
partners, especially the US and Japan, sometimes beyond the comfort 
level of Singapore’s neighbours. Singapore’s strong support for the US 
war against terrorism has been rewarded with much closer strategic, 
security and economic relations. " e country is the 11th largest trading 
partner of the US with two way trades worth over US$26.3 billion in 
2007.70
Singapore has traditionally been concerned with its economic prosperity, 
which is dependent on international trade. Singapore is a major trans-
shipment hub and sits astride the east-west main route within the global 
hub of container network. It has the second largest container port in 
the world. Hence, the city-state is eager to see the safety of navigation 
ensured in the Straits of Malacca. " e Singapore Coast Guard (SCG), 
which has gone through an upgrading program since the early 1990s, 
is directly involved in preventing piracy acts in its territorial waters.71 
In addition, the city-state has since 9/11, increased air and navy patrols 
in its air space and territorial waters. Singapore already possessed the 
most capable naval and maritime security forces in Southeast Asia and 
does not require as much external assistance in terms of equipment and 
training except for joints operations.Singapore further encourages the 
physical presence of external naval or maritime forces in the vital Straits. 
70 US trade with Singapore, 2007, http://singapore.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/ (29 
February 2008)
71 R. Emmers, Comprehensive security and resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s 
approach to terrorism and sea piracy, p. 12.
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  e third littoral states, Singapore in contrast to Indonesia and Malaysia 
desperately wants a greater US presence in the Straits. It sees the value 
of a US presence not merely in commercial terms but also as a military 
counterweight to maintain stability and peace in the Asia Pacifi c region.72 
Singapore has emerged as a principle security ally of the US in Southeast 
Asia since the end of the Cold War, particularly following the departure 
of the US from Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines in 1992.  It 
actively searches for ways to keep the US engaged in the region.
CONCLUSION
  is paper has examined the littoral states’ position towards piracy 
and their interests in the Straits of Malacca as well as the position on 
external power involvement. Overall, the strategic importance of the 
Straits of Malacca continues to grow. Today, the Straits of Malacca 
retains its eminence as a commercial sea lane and strategic waterway. As 
globalisation takes hold of the world, the Straits of Malacca fi nds itself 
still very much a key artery of global commerce, serving over one third 
of seaborne trade. In a way, one might say that the Straits of Malacca has 
contributed substantially to the development of nations which are heavily 
reliant on inter-continental trade. Not only the littoral states but also 
the major user states are concern on the safety of navigation particularly 
China, Japan and India.  eir expression of interest in the security of the 
Straits of Malacca is a refl ection of their eff orts to preserve their own 
individual strategic interests.
72 J.N. Mak, Unilateralism and regionalism, in, G.G. Ong-Web (ed.), Piracy, maritime 
terrorism and securing the Malacca Straits, p. 157.
